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subject knows that there is really no evidence for ultimism. If there is no 
evidence for the truth of ultimism, questions can be raised about whether 
such wilful assenting is psychologically too demanding to uphold. Our 
reasons for belief in the desirability of ultimism need to be extremely good 
to make the continuous effort of exercising our imagination worthwhile. 
Schellenberg answers this objection to some extent (chapter 3) by claiming 
that imagination combined with different kinds of religious practices is 
enough to support commitment in ultimism without belief. But if this is 
the case, what would motivate the faithful ultimist to engage in (sceptical) 
religious practices in the first place, if not some kind of belief? It is difficult 
to see where the initial motivation comes from if not from some kind of 
intuition or evidence “that there might be (some) truth to religion.”
Despite these open questions and issues, it must be acknowledged that 
Schellenberg has indeed been able to create a truly alternative position to 
those currently motivating most philosophy of religion. By doing so, he 
is deeply grounded in a tradition of Western philosophy that emphasises 
the pragmatic and non-evidential aspect of religion and also represents a 
contemporary reinvigoration of this tradition. 
Metaphysics and God: Essays in Honor of Eleonore Stump, edited by Kevin 
Timpe. New York: Routledge, 2009. 262 pages. $126 (hardback).
JOSEPH SHAW, St Benet’s Hall, Oxford University
The fourteen essays in this collection illustrate the range of interests of 
Eleonore Stump, in whose honor they have been written. While it would 
be impossible in a review to give a proper assessment of every paper, I 
shall pick out some contrasting examples with a view to saying something 
about the development of the discipline under Stump’s influence, illus-
trated by the collection as a whole.
Some of the essays here display a degree of precision which even the 
most demanding analytic philosopher could not fault. Brian Leftow’s 
“Aquinas, Divine Simplicity and Divine Freedom” and Thomas Flint’s 
“Fittingness and Divine Action in Cur Deus Homo” are careful, dense, and 
acute discussions of some very knotty problems.
In order to get to grips with his chosen problem, as a problem within 
the Thomist system (though certainly not only within that system), Leftow 
has to get to grips with Aquinas’s logical presuppositions, which include 
the idea that events become necessary when they are in the past. Leftow 
is to be commended for making clear (if not simple) the relationship be-
tween what Aquinas says, and the way we might express it.
This is a mere prologue, however, to the actual problem of divine sim-
plicity and freedom, which turns on whether and in what precise way, 
God might differ in different possible worlds, on Thomist principles. This 
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involves an understanding of the Thomist account of properties, not all of 
which are essential or accidental forms. Again, Leftow is admirably clear, 
sympathetic to his sources, but relentless in his questioning of proposed 
solutions.
Flint’s discussion has much in common with Leftow’s, in approach. 
He addresses a problem discussed by Anselm, of how the Incarnation 
could be fitting for God to do, without it being necessary for Him to do. 
Flint attempts to capture Anselm’s assumptions, which drive the problem 
Anselm addresses and the solutions Anselm proffers, in modal logic, 
which serves to make precise the issues at play in Anselm’s argument.
Interestingly both these papers conclude that the solutions they 
have had time to examine do not work, though it is possible that others 
might. This, of course, is part of the price one pays for this philosophical 
approach: by eschewing short cuts, one may not get to one’s destination.
Two other papers explore areas of Thomistic philosophical theology: 
Jason T. Eberl’s “Do Persons Exist between Death and Resurrection?,” and 
Christopher Brown’s “Friendship in Heaven: Aquinas on Supremely Per-
fect Happiness and the Communion of the Saints.” Both discussions are 
well done, and exemplify the way philosophy can clarify the issues in an 
arena where philosophy and theology interact.
C. P. Ragland’s paper “Love and Damnation” provides an interesting 
exploration of some theories of hell. One is the notion (related to C. S. 
Lewis’s The Great Divorce) that damned individuals are more “psychic re-
mains” than persons, since their life of wickedness has destroyed their 
personality. Another is Stump’s intriguing argument that in allowing the 
souls of those damned (for example) because of the sin of anger to con-
tinue to rage in hell, God is allowing them their greatest possible degree 
of actualisation, given the state of their personality by that stage. Ragland 
argues that God would not have more reason to maintain either “psychic 
remains” or the raging soul in existence, rather than annihilate them, if 
the only consideration was the good of the individual. Ragland goes on to 
suggest that a loving God would only leave souls in some form of hell if 
there was hope for their moral improvement.
It is a pity that Ragland’s discussion misses out on what appear to be 
two central features of the traditional understanding of hell, namely that it 
is justice, rather than love, which is the leading consideration, and that it is 
our earthly life, to the exclusion of our life after death, which is the sphere 
of choice, and where sin and merit are alone possible.
Michael C. Rea’s paper, “Narrative, Liturgy, and the Hiddenness of God” 
examines a problem which parallels that of the problem of evil: if God ex-
ists, and loves us, why does He seem to be hidden from us? Rea makes the 
point that there is no valid inference from God’s silence to God’s lack of 
concern for us or His non-existence, but continues: “The pressing question, 
of course, is what to do with the fact that God’s silence is painful for us.”1
1Michael Rea, “Narrative, Liturgy, and the Hiddenness of God,” in Metaphysics and God, 83.
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Rea’s positive suggestions, at the end of the paper, that Biblical narra-
tive and the liturgy are ways of having, in a certain sense, a mediated or 
vicarious experience of God, are interesting ones. We might think, how-
ever, that what is really needed is something from another discipline alto-
gether: that of mystical theology or spirituality.
Rea illustrates the painfulness of God’s hiddenness with a quotation 
from the diaries of Mother Teresa of Calcutta: “the reality of darkness & 
coldness & emptiness is so great that nothing touches my soul.”2 Rea is 
aware that this is a widely recorded experience, but does not address the 
explanation for it given by the spiritual tradition in which Mother Teresa 
wrote.3 This would be that she was experiencing that “dark night of the 
soul” which enables the more spiritually advanced to purify their love of 
God of self-gratification, such as might become associated with it when 
one’s experience of God is generally warm and consoling.
The assessment of this explanation of Mother Teresa’s experience, and 
that of others like her, is something which philosophy, analytic or not, is 
not qualified to attempt. The question of “what to do with” the phenom-
enology of the spiritual life is something which philosophers would do 
well to pass on to their colleagues in the theology department.
A parallel difficulty is presented in Timothy O’Connor’s paper “Theod-
icies and Human Nature: Dostoevsky on the Saint as Witness.” The article 
examines the problem of evil as set out in literary form by Dostoevsky 
and Camus, and the literary response made by Dostoevsky. Dostoevsky’s 
character Ivan would reject any putative “upheaval” in which it turns out 
the apparently pointless suffering of the innocent was necessary for some 
greater good, and which allows a reconciliation and forgiveness of all 
things. Ivan says
I don’t want it, out of love for mankind. I prefer to remain with my un-
avenged suffering and my unappeased anger—even if I happen to be wrong. 
I feel, moreover, that such harmony is rather overpriced.4
The resolution of this problem, by Dostoevsky, is (O’Connor suggests) 
in the form of the “saint,” the character the Elder Zossima, who embod-
ies the gradual conversion of heart which makes it possible to accept the 
reconciliation which God is taken to be preparing. Zossima’s testimony 
has weight, O’Connor explains, because Zossima himself converted from 
being “an angry, self-absorbed soldier” to the exceptionally gentle monk 
encountered in the book.5 The answer to Ivan seems to be that if Ivan were 
to allow grace to have its effect on him he, too, might find that he could 
accept the grand reconciliation planned by God.
2Ibid, 81.
3Ibid, 82.
4Timothy O’Connor, “Theodicies and Human Nature: Dostoevsky on the Saint as Wit-
ness,” in Metaphysics and God, 177.
5Ibid, 184.
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Dostoevsky’s readers will find this compelling to the degree that they 
find Zossima (and the rest of the book) psychologically plausible. Whether 
the book is satisfying at the literary level—at the level of its effect on its 
readers—is a question for literary critics, however, not for philosophers. 
Philosophers would do better to look for argumentative, not literary, force, 
and do what O’Connor does not do, and attempt a philosophical analysis 
of Ivan’s appeal.
In doing this we might note Ivan’s concern with justice, and his claim 
is that some cozy reconciliation between the mother of the child torn to 
pieces by the landlord’s dogs and the landlord is wrong. This is presum-
ably because Ivan wants to see some kind of retributive restoration of 
justice, of which he sees the Christian response as a saccharine evasion. 
Furthermore, he rejects the use being made of the suffering of children for 
a greater good, seeing that, again, as unjust.
It seems that Ivan’s “rebellion” is really against two popular claims: that 
God permits suffering only in order to bring about a greater good, and 
that everyone will in the end be saved. Ivan’s point is that this minimiza-
tion of suffering, regardless of whether it is of the innocent or of the guilty, 
comes at the cost of justice.
If we are impressed by Ivan’s argument, we can keep those claims out of 
our response to the problem of evil. Thus we could say that God permits 
the infliction of suffering on the innocent by the wicked not because each 
act of torture (or whatever) will necessarily give rise to a greater good, 
but simply because He has adopted a policy of permitting human free 
will to work out its consequences, perhaps within some limits, as the only 
way of preserving the great good of free will and the meaningful relation-
ships and human projects it makes possible. Furthermore, if a traditional 
understanding of divine justice is accepted, it is possible to share Ivan’s 
expectation that in a just universe there will be no reconciliation by cheap 
grace, but some combination of atonement, repentance and punishment. 
This may, of course, leave the position vulnerable to other criticisms, but 
at this point we are moving beyond the problem presented by Dostoevsky.
To generalize about this collection, one distinction which could be 
made would be between papers in which the theological principles are 
fixed, and those where they are up for grabs. The papers in this collection 
which deal with problems within the works of Thomas Aquinas (those 
of Leftow, Eberl, and Brown) or of Anselm (that of Flint) are examples of 
the former approach. By holding the theology fixed, it is possible to see 
how varying the philosophical claims in detail can make the overall posi-
tion more harmonious. If it can be shown that there is no way to resolve a 
philosophical problem created by a given set of theological assumptions, 
that would serve as an implicit critique of the theology.
By contrast, Ragland’s treatment of hell is an example of a discussion in 
which philosophical and theological assumptions are alike at issue. This 
introduces an additional degree of complexity into the discussion, and 
paradoxically it increases the danger that theological assumptions will be 
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smuggled into the discussion without comment or justification. Ragland’s 
rejection of the widespread theological claim that the earthly life is the 
sole sphere of choice, though central to Ragland’s argument, is never ar-
ticulated, let alone justified.
While it is tempting to vary the theological elements of a doctrine in 
order to solve philosophical problems, it should be remembered that 
theological claims need theological justification. It is one thing for a phi-
losopher to say “This combination of theological (or scientific) claims is 
philosophically problematic”; it is quite another to say “This theological 
(or scientific) claim ought to be accepted for philosophical reasons.”
One way to keep these problems within some limits is for a philosophi-
cal discussion of topics such as hell, the incarnation, providence, or the 
Trinity to be prefaced with an acknowledgement that the discussion will 
take for granted, insofar as it is possible, the theological understanding of 
the doctrine in some reasonably specific and (ideally) familiar tradition: 
mainstream traditional Christianity may be specific enough in some cases, 
though not in others. A parallel point holds about philosophy’s interaction 
with other disciplines, including science, religious experience, and litera-
ture. It is certainly not the case that an interdisciplinary approach, which 
Stump is credited with promoting, is wrong in principle; rather, openness 
to interdisciplinary projects requires more, not less, awareness of what 
kind of argument and what kind of claim are proper to each discipline.
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ROBERT MACSWAIN, The School of Theology, The University of the South
The last book of David Brown’s to be reviewed in this journal was The 
Divine Trinity, published in 1985 by Duckworth in the UK and Open Court 
in the US. Eleonore Stump began her review by stating that this “is an 
important book which I hope will influence the direction of certain work 
